

Russia's New Warfare tools
and the link to **Soviet Active Measures**

Russia's New Warfare tools
and the link to **Soviet Active Measures**

Russia's New Warfare tools and the link to **Soviet Active Measures**

Russia's New Warfare tools
and the link to **Soviet Active Measures**

Robert Seely

Robert Seely's book, which will be the first comprehensive study of all the tool of Russia's new non-conventional warfare, will be published next year

Seely is finishing a PhD in Russian non-conventional warfare at the War Studies Department, King's College, London. His field of expertise is in information and non-conventional warfare. He is the author of Russo-Chechen Conflict 1800-2000: A Deadly Embrace, published by Frank Cass Ltd. He co-authored: War and Humanitarian Action in Chechnya, published by the Thomas J. Watson Center of International Studies, Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island, USA. Seely was a foreign correspondent in the former Soviet Union from 1990 to 1994. He was a Fellow of Brown University. His most recent publication is Russian Full Spectrum Conflict: An Appraisal after Ukraine, was published in March 2015 in The Journal of Slavic Military Studies.

The shocking events of the past 18 months in Crimea and eastern Ukraine have brought home to Western audiences the aggressive reality of Russian tactics and behaviors to their immediate neighbors.

Yet as friends in Georgia and elsewhere have pointedly remarked, Russia's 'new' warfare in Ukraine is nothing new for people living in former Soviet republics, who believe that they have experienced Russian military, paramilitary, informational and political destabilization for years. Having lived in the Soviet Union and the states of the former Soviet Union in the early 1990s, I witnessed many of those events for myself.

Russia's New Warfare tools
and the link to **Soviet Active Measures**



Yet Russia's 'new' form of warfare still remains something of an enigma because it contains so many elements, and has so far not been examined in detail. For the past fifteen months I have been studying it for my book to be published next year. It is clear that there remains a genuine confusion amongst Western academics and writers about how to define and categorise this 'new' warfare. In different states it takes, chameleon-like, a different guise and uses different tools. In Crimea, "little green men" appeared from nowhere to man checkpoints, as did paramilitary groups, followed by a well-organised and primed secession campaign. In eastern Ukraine a down-and-dirty separatist movement speedily evolved into an armed insurgency, backed by an umbilical cord allegedly linked to Russian forces stationed across the open border. In the Baltic republics, this 'war' has consisted of battles over language rights, information campaigns waged through the Russian language media, and the co-option of politicians, especially in Latvia. Against the Western states, Russia's tools include its global information arm, Russia Today, diplomacy and public outreach, agents of influence as well as the regular and occasionally dangerous naval and air posturing over the skies of the Baltic and Northern Seas as Russia reverts to Cold War patterns of behavior.

This article examines Russia's chameleon warfare, and questions its links to a previous form of subversive warfare from the Soviet era. It looks first at initial reactions in the West to Russia's actions in Crimea and

Ukraine, before providing a brief overview of Russian traditions of revolutionary and non-conventional warfare, and how these sit with Western concepts. It then looks at some of the tools of Russian power and how they may be being applied, both in the countries of the former Soviet Union, and European and North American states.

Before we look to the descriptions and how it was understood, let us briefly understand the definitions of warfare. Carl Von Clausewitz, the father of Western military theory, called war: "an act of violence to compel our opponent to fulfil our will." ¹

It was Clausewitz who was responsible for the maxim that war was the continuation of politics by other means. This last point is highly important to remember when dealing with Russian revolutionary and ideological warfare.

Current descriptions of war generally include a tick-list of descriptors; that it consists of fighting (kinetic activity), between organised groups, with one side a government, there needs to be a minimum of 25 deaths per year and fighting must be reasonably consistent, and not merely sporadic². It is a little more difficult to categorically state definitions of conventional and unconventional war. There is no Western military doctrinal definition of 'conventional' war, although there are a few definitions for unconventional war. These centre around the idea that unconventional warfare fighters find and exploit regular

army weaknesses and adjust their tactics according, so that: “even when violence is joined, direct methods are generally avoided for the classic techniques of guerrilla warfare, terrorism, sabotage, subversion, and insurgency,” according to a 2008 US Military definition^{3,4}. Since the Iraq and Afghan wars, there have been a plethora of new terms to describe unconventional wars in which the West has been engaged; asymmetric, hybrid, ambiguous, Three Block War, Fourth Generation warfare, Full Spectrum warfare and targeting, etc. Each term focuses on a different element or aspect of unconventional warfare, but all are broadly share the same ideas that modern armed forces need to be highly flexible and adaptive, be able to mix tactics, use ‘kinetic’ [violent] and non-kinetic [non-violent] measures in a seamless and coherent way, and understand the centrality of messaging and information operations in warfare; a communication in modern doctrine can be a bomb or a message; both have their place in the political narrative.

So the first question is, what sort of warfare is Russia's? As events unfolded in 2014, commentators and Governments searched for terminology to describe this ‘new’ warfare. A UK Parliamentary report used a variety of terms, including asymmetric and ambiguous warfare⁵. Asymmetry in warfare has generally referred to the use of irregular military tactics, such as suicide bombers or improvised explosives used against regular forces, whilst ambiguous warfare conjures up ideas of tactics of destabilization which float in a legally undefined space, against which it is difficult to react.

¹Howard M., 2002, Clausewitz, A Very Short Introduction, Oxford, Oxford University Press, Kindle Location 1021

² A point made by Michael Brzoska in Is there a necessity for new definitions of war, <https://www.bicc.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Publications/bulletins/bulletin38.pdf> [accessed 30 August 2015]

³US Field Manual, 2007, FM 3-05.201, (S/NF) Special Forces Unconventional Warfare (U), <https://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-05-130.pdf> [accessed 30 August 2015]

⁴ ibid.

⁵ House of Commons. Towards the next Defence and Security Review: Part Two-NATO - Defence Committee, Summary and Recommendations, House Of Commons, <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmselect/cmdfence/358/35803.htm>[accessed 31 Aug 2015]

Mark Galeotti, Professor at New York University, called Russia's actions 'guerrilla geopolitics'⁶, saying that NATO had no answer to them: **“These are tactics that NATO – still, in the final analysis, an alliance designed to deter and resist a mass, tank-led Soviet invasion – finds hard to know how to handle”**⁷.

John Schindler, formerly of the US Naval War College, called Russia's use of force 'special war', and said that Moscow excelled at it⁸. Others referred to the expression 'hybrid war' to describe Russian actions, a term first used in 2005/6 to describe Hezbollah's tactics against Israel, and implying the use of different forms of conventional and non-conventional warfare tactics at the same time. Still others referred

to the conflict as belonging to the 'Gerasimov doctrine', following an influential article by the Russian Chief of Staff in the Russia's Military Industrial Courier journal. In it, Gen. Gerasimov echoed the Kremlin's desire to understand and operationalize non-conventional war, saying that the “very rules of war have substantially changed,” and that the “role of non-military means to achieve political and strategic aims has increased, which in some cases far exceeds force of arms in its effectiveness.”⁹ This article has been interpreted as giving regular army approval to Russia's new, non-conventional form of warfare and accepting a supporting role in that. Peter Pomerantsev, who has written extensively about Russian information warfare, called the Kremlin's tactics 'the reinvention of warfare.'¹⁰ Pomerantsev disagreed with President Obama's lazy accusation that that Putin was stuck in the 'old ways,' saying:

look closer at the Kremlin's actions during the crisis in Ukraine and you begin to see a very 21st century mentality, manipulating transnational financial interconnections, spinning global media, and reconfiguring geo-political alliances. Could it be that the West is the one caught up in the “old ways,” while the Kremlin is the geopolitical avant-garde, informed by a dark, subversive reading of globalization?¹¹

⁶ Galeotti, M. 2014, The 'Gerasimov Doctrine' and Russian Non-Linear War, weblog, accessed 31st August 2015, <http://inmoscowshaows.wordpress.com/2014/07/06/the-gerasimov-doctrine-and-russian-non-linear-war/>

⁷ Galeotti, M. 2014, The 'Gerasimov Doctrine' and Russian Non-Linear War, weblog, accessed 31st August 2015, <http://inmoscowshaows.wordpress.com/2014/07/06/the-gerasimov-doctrine-and-russian-non-linear-war/>

⁸ Schindler, J. 2013, We're Entering The Age of 'Special War', weblog, accessed 31 August 2015, <http://www.businessinsider.com/were-entering-the-age-of-special-war-2013-9>

⁹ Gerasimov, V., 2013. Tsennost Nauki v Prvedenii, Voenno-Promishlennyyi Kurier, 27 February to 5 March, p. 2, http://vpk-news.ru/sites/default/files/pdf/VPK_08_476.pdf, [accessed 1 June 2015]

¹⁰ Pomerantsev, P. 2014. How Putin Is Reinventing Warfare, Foreign Policy. Available at: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/05/05/how_putin_is_reinventing_warfare [Accessed 30 August 2015]

¹¹ *ibid.*

The term 'non-linear war' has caught the imagination. It has been coined by Putin advisor Vladislav Surkov, mentioned in a fictional short-story (almost certainly) written by Surkov writing under his non de plume, Nathan Dubovitsky. It's a fictional story containing references to a dystopian world of all-against-all.

It was the first non-linear war. In the primitive wars of the 19th and 20th centuries it was common for just two sides to fight. Two countries, two blocks of allies. Now four coalitions collided. Not two against two, or three against one. All against all ¹².

Finally, British academic Victor Maderia argues that Russia's 'new' warfare is an updated version of Active Measures, the term to denote subversive war-

Russia's New Warfare tools
and the link to **Soviet Active Measures**



fare as practised by the KGB, the Communist Party and Soviet Military Intelligence Main Intelligence Directorate, the GRU. Putin's new warfare is, said Maderia, is "Active Measures Plus, Plus."¹³ In research for my book on Russian's new warfare, I have come to conclusions similar to Maderia's. There is a very considerable overlap between what Active Measures was, and what Russia's new warfare is, especially if the focus of the definition on the effect (subversion), rather than narrowly on the tools used.

So is this form of warfare new? No, and yes. No, in the sense that many of the tools were those practiced by the Soviet Union. Some of those tools may superficially be 'new.' Cyber is new, but it is really only another channel, just like radio and television were in their day. Other tools, such as the uses of agents of influence, or disinformation, or maskirovka, deception to mask intent, are either Soviet or even Tsarist in their roots. The Swedish Defence Research Agency concluded that the only novelty about the Crimean annexation was that the Russians had executed it successfully.¹⁴ But this form of warfare, however one wants to call it, is 'new' in a few critical ways. First, most Western experts and governments did not see it coming (despite being signposted for several years) and did not know how to react when it happened. It is also 'new' in terms of the extraordinary breathe of the tools available, wider even than during the Cold War. Finally, one could even interpret this new warfare as an 'operational art,' a new method of state-on-state warfare which, although it may not be legal, is also not illegal, and can be practiced in some form without the massive costs, political or economic, of conventional war, and on a near permanent basis,

¹² Dubovitsky N. (2014) Bez Neba, Russki Pioneer, 12 March, Available at: <http://www.ruspioneer.ru/honest/m/single/4131> [Accessed 31 August 2015]

¹³ Author talk at Nuffield College, Oxford, 21 Oct 2014

¹⁴ Niklas G, Johannes M. and Gudrun P, eds. 2015. A Rude Awakening, Ramifications of Russian Aggression Towards Ukraine, Totalförsvarets Forskningsinstitut, Stockholm, <http://www.foi.se/en/Search/Abstract/?rNo=FOI-R--3892--SE>, [Accessed 30 August 2015]

Active Measures is not a household term, either in Russia, the former Soviet republics, or the West. Yet it describes a form of warfare practiced by the USSR in the second half of the 20th century which is likely to become one of the most important forms of warfare of the 21st century, indeed it may become the single most practiced form of war between states.

Even now, there has been no single, accepted definition of Active Measures. In the 1980s the State department described it as covert, information operations. By contrast, the House Intelligence Committee gave it a much broader definition, describing it as:

“Manipulation and media control, written and oral disinformation, use of foreign communist parties and front organizations, clandestine radio broadcasting, manipulation of the economy, kidnappings, paramilitary operations, and support of guerrilla groups and terrorist organizations. Under Joseph Stalin, active measures also included political assassinations.”¹⁵

Active Measures gained the name in the late 1950s to distinguish it from so-called passive measures, such as monitoring, bugging, etc. Western states learned about Active Measures in part from Cold War defectors such as Czech spy Ladislav Bittman and Hungarian diplomat Laszlo Szabo. Different defectors have put different emphases on Active Measures, ranging from Kaznacheev in the 1960s, Bezmenov in the 1970s to Gordievsky and Mithrokhin in the 1980s. The term has been used relatively interchangeably with ‘disinformation’, ‘political warfare’ and ‘ideological warfare’. All agree that informational operations have been at the heart of Active Measures, and that more broadly, Active Measures was a set of tools built around subversion, disinformation and influencing target audiences. Some argued it

was purely covert; some that it was overt and covert. Others argued, as the House Committee did, that violence was part of Active Measures, or at least related to it. What was also clear was the concept that effects should be seamless - something which modern Western military forces have had great trouble in trying to achieve in Iraq and Afghanistan. The entire ensemble of capabilities should be seen as one. As former Soviet leader Konstantin Chernenko told the Communist Party Central committee.

Comrades, our entire system of ideological work should operate as a well-arranged orchestra in which every instrument has a distinctive voice and leads its theme, while harmony is achieved by skillful conducting.¹⁶

Active Measures very much fits into the revolutionary warfare tradition of Russian non-conventional warfare. Through the 19th century Russian revolutionaries fought against an autocratic Russian state using concepts such as propaganda of the deed, the notion that acts of violence will encourage others to rise up. Lenin, in works such as *What Is To Be Done* and *Lesson From The Moscow Uprising*, developed many tactics that are now familiar to revolutionaries and urban terrorists; the concept of the professional party cadres, the creative use of targeted violence, assassination and the centrality of propaganda, not only to win people over but as a coercive tool to divide and demoralise opponents. As American writer Bernard Fall commented later in the century: "Revolutionary warfare equals guerrilla warfare plus political action."¹⁷

The new, Soviet Cheka secret police quickly learned their tradecraft; deception, infiltration, provocations, from their Tsarist predecessors, and added the Bolshevik obsession with propaganda and ideological,

revolutionary war. From the 1920s onwards the new Bolshevik state projected these techniques externally. External broadcast propaganda began in 1933, and grew exponentially, so by 1962 some 3,800 hours per week of programming were being broadcast in 60 languages.¹⁸ Before and after the War the Soviets invested heavily in establishing 'front' groups controlled directly or indirectly by Moscow. Otto Kuusinen, the Finnish Communist Leader who was secretary of the Comintern Presidium, argued:

“We must create a whole solar system of organisations and smaller communities around the Communist Party ... working actually under the influence of our Party but not under mechanical leadership.”¹⁹

Russia's New Warfare tools and the link to Soviet Active Measures



¹⁶ Romerstein, H. 1989. Soviet Active Measures and Propaganda, Influence Activities in the Gorbachev Era, Toronto, The Mackenzie Institute, p.7, quoting from Chernenko, K. “Topical Questions of the Party’s Ideological and Mass Political Work,” Information Bulletin, August 1983, Page 24 [Information Bulletin is a publication issued by World Marxist Review – Problems of Peace and Socialism, headquartered in Prague and guided by the International Department of the Central Committee, CPSU].

¹⁷ Fall, B. The Theory and Practice of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency, Naval War College Review, Winter 1998, reprinted from 1965

¹⁸ Clews, J. 1964. Communist Propaganda Techniques, London, Cox and Wyman, p. 85

¹⁹ The Communist Solar System, Labour Party 1925, Sept 1933, quoted in Rose, C. 1988. The Soviet Propaganda Network, A Directory of Organisations Serving Soviet Foreign Policy, London, St Martin’s Press, London, p. 32

These groups served as ‘transmissions belts’ to knowingly or unknowingly propagandise on behalf of the Soviet Union and world Communism. Defectors in the 1970s and 1980s, such as Romanian General Ion Pacepa, described Warsaw Pact subversion operations without seeing a distinction between violence and non-violent activity. Activities of non-violence subversion included the printing and distribution en masse of the anti-Semitic tracts throughout the Middle East. Violent action included international terrorism, which he said was; “conceived at the Lubyanka, the headquarters of the KGB, in the aftermath of the 1967 Six-Day War in the Middle East. I witnessed its birth in my other life, as a Communist general.”²⁰ He also argued that airplane hijacking was the invention of the KGB. “Airplane hijacking is my own invention,” the Soviet KGB General Aleksandr Sakharovsky allegedly told Pacepa.²¹ Both forms of subversions; violent and non-violent, are designed to generate violent activity. Again, the purpose is to use all tools at one’s disposal.

What has been extraordinary is the extent to which the tools now being used by Moscow echo previous tools used by the KGB, the GRU or the Communist Party. And there are many tools which they using. In my research I have discovered over 40 tools that Russia uses in this new non-conventional war, by which Russia is attempting to create what Danish academic Jakob Tolstrup has called “managed instability.”²² But to understand this warfare properly, one needs a proper structure to understand it.

Since 2010 the terminology that Western military academia has used to describe a nation-state’s broad set of tools of power and influence behaviour is DIME. This stands for diplomatic, information (sometimes the ‘I’ stands for Intelligence), Military and Economic. DIME was too narrow a definition, and it has been expanded recently to DIMEFIL, which includes the following tools, diplomatic, informational, military, economic, financial, intelligence, and law enforcement. There have been other tools and acronyms used as well. In the 1980s military strategist John Collins outlined four elements of Soviet strategy: (conventional) military strategy, economics, psychological warfare (political) and diplomacy.²³ Janusz Bugajski²⁴ lists 14 concrete levers (2004) of influence.

Hedenskog and Larsson²⁵ work with five groups (political, human-based, energy, economic and military levers), while Thomas X Hammes identifies four networks: political, economic, social and military. These different tools of power also in an earlier age went by the name of grand strategy. Perhaps the most famous theorist of the 20th century, Sir Basil Liddell-Hart, commented:

Fighting power is but one of the instruments of grand strategy – which should take account of and apply the power of financial pressure, of diplomatic pressure, of commercial pressure, and not least of ethical pressure, to weaken the opponents’ will ...²⁶

²⁰ Pacepa, I. 2006. What does Moscow have to do with the recent war in Lebanon? National Review, 24 August. Available at: <http://www.nationalreview.com/article/218533/russian-footprints-ion-mihai-pacepa> [Accessed 31 August 2015]

²¹ Pacepa, I. 2006. What does Moscow have to do with the recent war in Lebanon? National Review, 24 August. Available at: <http://www.nationalreview.com/article/218533/russian-footprints-ion-mihai-pacepa> [Accessed 31 August 2015]

²² Interview with author, 30 January 2015

²³ Collins, JM. Grand Strategy: Principles and Practices, quoted in Chotikul, D. 1986. The Soviet Theory of Reflexive Control in Historical and Psychological Perspective: A Preliminary Study, California, Naval Postgraduate School. Available from: <https://archive.org/details/soviettheoryofre00chot>, Accessed 6 Jan 2015 [Accessed 31 August 2015]

²⁴ Bugajski, J. 2004. Cold Peace, Russia’s New Imperialism, Westport, Praeger

²⁵ Hedenskog, J. Larsson, RL. 2007. Russian Leverage on the CIS and the Baltic States, Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI). Available from: http://foi.se/ReportFiles/foir_2280.pdf [Accessed 30 August 2015]

²⁶ Liddell-Hart, B. 1991 (1958). Strategy, London Meridian, p. 322,

Russia's New Warfare tools and the link to Soviet Active Measures

However, arguably nation-states have not managed to formulate ways of combining these different sets of powers, with Russia one of the few exceptions. Whilst all these interpretations are useful, most seem to miss key elements, including Command, Control, Doctrine and the intellectual background to action. Without these elements, it becomes difficult to reach a true understanding of the actions of others. Beyond this, clearly then one needs to include the standard elements, conventional force, information warfare, political, diplomacy, etc. There isn't the space in his article to do justice to the 40+ elements of Russia's 'new' non-conventional warfare although several tactics are worth highlight. But let us look at a few examples to show the breadth of Russia's tactics.

It is important in the Ukrainian case to understand the role of conventional forces in this new warfare. Traditionally in forms of non-conventional violence, the role of a conventional army has been very limited. In the Western understanding, conventional support to non-conventional operations has generally amounted to training and equipment supply. Yet arguably in Ukraine the role of the Russian conventional army has been critical. There is clearly some overlap here with the Georgian experience, both in the 2008 war with Russia and in the experiences in the original Abkhaz violence in the early 1990s. Russia's conventional forces have been used to send warning messages (via the conduct of exercises on other nation's borders) and to prepare for combat (via the same exercises). In the location and positioning, their purpose has been to act as a supply line for men and material. However, that positioning also has a critical secondary use. By 'parking' a significant military force on the border between it and the victim state, Russia effectively seizes what one could term key terrain, and prevents their proxy forces inside the state from being encircled. In addition the conventional force has a vital additional role, as a source of manpower. As the Ukrainian forces have improved their capability and fighting skills, they have threatened to overwhelm the separatist groups. Increasingly we have seen Russian troops drafted into eastern Ukraine, under the guise of proxy force. This is certainly the Ukrainian claim and it is difficult to argue against it. On 28 Aug the Ukrainian Presidential administration held a press conference to detail



the evidence of Russian military involvement, arguing that since this summer the Ukrainian state was now, in the words of the excellent Interpreter website, “confronting not mixed Russian terrorist groups, but structured military units of the Russian regular army.”²⁷ In this, there is a strong link to the original Abkhazian war where Russia, via its ‘proxy’ force, recalibrated its use of military power and equipment until it was able to overwhelm the Georgian force. This was documented in Georgia and elsewhere at the time. The tactic enables Russia to almost guarantee success, so whenever its proxy force faces defeat or severe setbacks, it will simply increase the level of violence, using better training soldiers, or battle-winning kit until such time as the victim is defeated.

Let’s look at so-called soft power effects. Within the Baltic republics, one of the tools Russia uses are the so-called compatriot clubs to attempt, to “organise and coordinate the Russian diaspora living in foreign countries to support the objectives and interests of

Russian foreign policy under the direction of Russian departments,”²⁸ according to the Estonian Security Service. Other areas which have been overlooked include Russia’s use of food bans against the Baltic, as well as Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia. Russia’s use of energy supplies to pressure Ukraine is well-known, but it also uses transit fees for rail and other raw material export. Turning to Western Europe, Russia is again using public diplomacy to attempt to manipulate – again with limited success – European public opinion. So for example in early 2015 Russian ambassador to Denmark Mikhail Vanin threatened the Danes with military force in a manner reminiscent of Soviet threats to European states during the advanced years of the Cold War if Denmark supported the US Missile Defence plans. “I don’t think the Danes fully understand the consequence if Denmark joins the American-led missile defence shield. If they do, then Danish warships will be targets for Russian nuclear missiles,” Vanin told the Jyllands-Posten newspaper.²⁹ He continued:

Denmark would be part of the threat against Russia. It would be less peaceful and relations with Russia will suffer. If is, of course, your own decision – I just want to remind you that your finances and security will suffer. At the same time Russia has missiles that certainly can penetrate the future global missile defence system.”³⁰

²⁷ ‘Ukrainian Government Releases Evidence Of Russian Military Involvement In Donbass,’ The Interpreter, 28th August 2015. Available at: <http://www.interpretermag.com/ukraine-live-day-557-ukraine-reports-109-attacks-over-past-day/#9758> [Accessed 31 August 2015]

²⁸ Estonian Internal Security Service Annual Review 2013. 2013. Tallinn, p. 6. Available from: https://www.kapo.ee/cms-data/_text/138/124/files/kapo-annual-review-2013-eng.pdf [Accessed 31 March 2015]

Russia's New Warfare tools and the link to Soviet Active Measures

This is almost reminiscent of the messaging that the Soviet Union used in the late 1970s and 1980s when trying to prevent the locating of Cruise and Pershing missiles. Moving onto espionage, Russia has allegedly increased its spying operations in many European countries, including the UK, Sweden and Poland.³¹ It has also taken a more aggressive military posture. In 2014 there were more than 400 intercepts of Russian military aircraft by NATO,³² including 68 hot identifications along the Lithuanian border. Latvia recorded 150 incidents of Russian planes entering its airspace.³³ Bear bombers now make regular sorties to test UK responses. The long-range aviation force of which the Bear is part is primarily a political messaging tool: we are back, we don't like you and we can hit you.

Finally, on information operations. The 2005 launch of Russia Today heralded Russia's return to global propaganda. Its aim similar to that of the Soviet Union's information outlets: to divide opinion, to question the values of liberal civilisation, to make the case that all truth is relative, to create distrust in Government, and so confuse Western public opinion over Russia. This is fundamentally no different from what the USSR did from the 1960s through to the late 1980s. Again, there is tendency to see this as being new, rather than a continuation of what the Soviets did. "It's a new kind of propaganda, aimed at sowing doubt about anything having to do with the U.S. and the West, and in a number of countries, unsophisticated audiences are eating it up," Helle C. Dale told the US House Foreign Affairs Committee.

This is just a snapshot of a few of the tools of Russia's new warfare. Many of these tools were part and parcel of the Active Measures 'toolkit' used by the Communist Party, the KGB and the GRU and even their Tsarist forebears, to spread revolution during the Bolshevik uprising, the Russian civil war and inside and outside the Soviet Union from the 1920s onwards. From the early days of the revolution, wrote Peter Kenez: "The institutions of mass mobilization became integral parts of the Soviet system." These techniques were further developed during the 1960s onwards, and turned into a systematic attempt to undermine free states and free media. That attempt failed strategically, although many tactical victories

were won by the USSR. New tactics have since been added, cyber and trolling has been rolled into the toolkit of effect, and most of all, the conductor role outlined by Soviet leader Chernenko appears to have been played tactically well. However, Russia's expertise at this form of war does not imply it will achieve its aims. Arguably the Ukrainian war is a strategic disaster for Russia and it will drive Ukraine and Ukrainians away from Russia. It does however mean that those who live in free states, in the Caucasus or the West, need to think carefully to ensure we understand Russia's new warfare and are able to protect ourselves against it.

²⁹ Daily Telegraph, 2015. Russia warns Denmark its warships could become nuclear targets. Daily Telegraph, 21st March. Available at: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/denmark/11487509/Russia-warns-Denmark-its-warships-could-become-nuclear-targets.html> [Accessed 30 July 2015]

³⁰ Daily Telegraph, 2015. Russia warns Denmark its warships could become nuclear targets. Daily Telegraph, 21st March. Available at: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/denmark/11487509/Russia-warns-Denmark-its-warships-could-become-nuclear-targets.html> [Accessed 30 July 2015]

³¹ See for example, Foy, H. Spies of Warsaw return as east-west tensions rise, Financial Times, 31 October, 2014, <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/60bc4b0e-6034-11e4-98e6-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3kK1Nx1Mp>, [Accessed 30 August 2014]

³² The Economist, 2015. From cold war to hot war. The Economist, 14th Feb. Available at: <http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21643220-russias-aggression-ukraine-part-broader-and-more-dangerous-confrontation> [Accessed 31 August 2015]

³³ *ibid.*